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Bianco: The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation

THE MECHANICS OF FUTURES TRADING:
SPECULATION AND MANIPULATION
JosephJ. Bianco*
If the House of Representatives aptly characterized the futures
markets as "volatile and esoteric,"1 it is the task of this Symposium
generally, and this article in particular, to render the subject less
esoteric. To understand the issues discussed in this Symposium, it
is essential to understand the mechanics of futures markets in a
contemporary context.
A "future" is common parlance for the standard vehicle of
commodities trading, the contract for future delivery. A futures
contract is a bilateral executory agreement which provides that the
seller will deliver to the buyer a specified amount of a particular
grade of a given commodity at a stated place and future time. 2 The
futures contract developed to insulate farmers and food processors
from the enormous seasonal and cyclical risks inherent in the production and distribution of perishable food products. 3 The establishment of exchanges in the nineteenth century mitigated the
problems which developed as American agricultural production
vastly expanded. Futures exchanges were a stabilizing force in the
risky, unpredictable, and unstructured nineteenth century farm industry. Exchanges enabled the fragmented midcentury farm structure to evolve by 1900 into an efficient production and marketing
4
system.
From these roots emerged the erroneous but durable notion
that futures trading is a purely agricultural phenomenon, a mere
byproduct of the farming and marketing of food. Unfortunately,
early federal regulation of commodities trading reflected this popu-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. B.A., 1972, New York University; J.D., 1975, Yale University.
1. H.R. REP.No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
2. For a discussion of the terms of futures contracts, see T. HIERONYMUS,
ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 36-40 (2d ed. 1977).

3. General Guide, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 104 (1977).
4. For a discussion of the important role of commodities exchanges in the development of modem American agriculture, with international comparisons, see J.
BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 10-18 (1949).
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lar misconception. 5 The forerunner of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)6 was the Commodity Exchange Au-

thority (CEA).7 The CEA conducted its operations within the aegis
and physical confines of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).8 It is generally believed that the CEA's location and
its consequent outlook contributed markedly to its inability to con-

trol market abuses. 9 Because of its ineffectiveness, the CEA was
abolished by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974 (the CFTC Act).10
Passage of the CFTC Act may indicate congressional acceptance of the notion that commodity futures are not agricultural

items; however, as Commissioner Rainbolt notes, futures are still
primarily regarded as ancillary to the marketing of agricultural

products." In light of the history of federal regulation, this misconception is understandable. It is, however, intolerable. Futures
are not commodities; commodities are not futures. An analysis of

this seemingly facile distinction can aid in comprehending not only
the true nature of the markets, but the proper goals of CFIC regulation as well.
"Commodities" are physical products. Many commodities underlying futures are agricultural; many are not.12 However, every
commodity differs fundamentally from a similarly denominated future. For example, while a simple cash transaction in wheat is unquestionably an agricultural event, trading wheat futures in an

open outcry auction market requires a level of sophistication that
greatly exceeds that required for cash trading. The relationship between the cash market and the futures market is complex and sub5. For a history of federal regulation of futures trading, see Rainbolt, Regulating
the Grain Gamblerand His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1977).
6. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was created by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, j 101(a),
88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (Supp. V 1975)).
7. The Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) was the administrative arm of
the Commodity Exchange Commission. The Commission was created by the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 3, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (repealed 1974).
8. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 314.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-44 (1974); Note, The Role of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REv. 710, 717-18 (1975).
10. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)).
11. See Rainbolt, supra note 5, at 8.
12. Futures contracts for 39 different commodities were traded during August
1977. FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION INC., BULL.No. 2886, FUTURES CONTRACTS
TRADED AUGUST 1977 (1977). Approximately half the commodities were agricultural.
See id.
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tie. There is only an indirect price relationship between the two.' 3
Cash price reflects supply and demand at a particular time and

place, but futures price reflects anticipation of supply and demand
across time and regardless of place. Although futures price ap-

proaches "spot" price 14 as the contract expiration date approaches,
futures contracts frequently go off the board at a price that differs
substantially from the corresponding cash price. 15
The reasons for this discrepancy between cash price and futures expiration price are complex. Fundamentally, it is not a function of futures markets to provide a source of supply for the commodity itself.16 Thus, physical delivery and receipt of a commodity

take place on fewer than one percent of outstanding futures con-

tracts. 17
Although cash commodity transactions in agricultural items

might logically be regulated by an arm of the USDA, futures are
more appropriately regulated by an agency with market experience

and broader perspective. Futures regulation by the USDA is
analogous to the regulation of "transportation" securities by the In-

terstate Commerce Commission. While the Interstate Commerce
Commission was established to deal with the everyday functions of

transportation businesses, that Commission could not deal effectively with the trading of equity securities. Commodity futures
markets are often miscast as forums for the exchange of tangibles.

Insofar as they are intangibles and insofar as their prices are sub13. For a discussion of this relationship, see Telser, Futures Trading and the
Storage of Cotton and Wheat, 66 J.POLITICAL ECON. 233 (1958).
14. "Spot" price is "[t]he price at which the physical commodity is selling." S.
REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. app. IX, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5843, 5894.
15. A reading of the commodities page of The Wall Street Journal will demonstrate the differences between cash prices and prices of futures which are about to
expire. Compare Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1977, at 6, col. 4 (lumber spot price) with id. at
col. 5 (lumber futures price).
16. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 204.
17. Id. at 41. There are two alternative methods of legally extinguishing a futures contract once it has been purchased or sold through an exchange. Id. The more
common method of liquidation is to offset the original trade by taking an opposite
position in the same market sometime before the contract expiration date. Id. at 42.
On rare occasions, a speculator or hedger will fulfill his contractual obligation by
effecting physical delivery of the commodity. Id. at 41. Formerly, futures contracts in
which neither party ever intended to make any physical transfer, and in which both
parties intended at the time of contracting that the contract was to be settled by
payment only of differences in price, were regarded as gambling and voided as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 1938).
This notion evidences a basic misunderstanding of the markets, and contributes to
the suspicion that often surrounds futures speculation.
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ject to the peculiar vagaries of crop forecasts, consumption estimates, and meteorological forecasts, futures contracts should be
regulated in the same manner as corporate securities, 1 8 whose
prices are determined by the equally uncertain predictions of book
value and earnings. Securities are to their underlying corporations
as futures are to their underlying commodities. Trading the rights
to an item on an organized exchange is distinguishable from trading
the item. Because farm futures markets are intimately concerned
with agriculture, agricultural interests should have easy access to
any futures regulatory body. However, futures trading must be
perceived as unique and must be regulated by its own administrative system.
Notwithstanding the CFTC's informed approach to defining
and regulating the markets, the popular perception of futures as
primarily agricultural is highly dysfunctional. Perhaps the gravest
consequence is that this mistaken notion limits the markets' utility
to the general public, which constitutes the vast majority of potential traders. 19 One of the most prominent scandals that precipitated passage of the CFTC Act involved the fraudulent marketing of
putative "commodities options." 2 0 These agricultural and nonagricultural options were sold not to hedgers, but to great numbers of
average speculators 2 ' who sought an alternative vehicle for use of
risk capital in light of the depressed condition of the securities markets. CFTC encouragement of greater public participation in futures markets would benefit all who use the market, dispelling the
notion that only farmers trade in futures.
SPECULATION: BEARING THE RISKS

The true role of the speculator has also been woefully misunderstood. Commissioner Rainbolt aptly indicates that many provi18. The author recommends the discontinuance of the mistaken practice of
treating option trades in unregulated commodities as sales of securities. For a discussion of this practice, see Borton & Abrahams, Options on Commodity Futures Contracts as Securities in California, 29 Bus. LAw. 867 (1974); Selvers, Investment
Contracts: Expanding Effective Securities Regulation, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 525,
539-44 (1974).
19. In 1973, only an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 individuals traded futures.
It was estimated that this figure would rise to approximately 5,000,000 by 1980. Few
new traders were expected to be professionals. Barron's, May 28, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
20. See Rainbolt, supra note 5, at 14. The options involved in the scandal were
"naked." Options are naked "where the contract supposedly secured by the option
premium was never purchased or margined for future purchase." H.R. REP. No. 975,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974).
21. Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
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sions of the current law are legacies of the groundless polemics
directed at speculators by architects of the 1936 futures legislation.2 2 As recently as 1973, remarks such as these by Senator
George McGovern were not uncommon:
The people's interest in commodity trading transcends the orderly functioning of those markets and the prevention of outright
fraud. For every time a speculator turns an unreasonable profit
by trading futures, the housewife and the consumer pay the
price. And since it is the speculator, not the producer, who receives the windfall profit, the higher wholesale and retail prices
do not act as a stimulant to production.23
Thus, the speculator is frequently viewed as a-sinister character.
The meaning of "unreasonable profit" is abstruse because, from the
standpoint of the dealer with no interest in the underlying commodity itself, futures trading is a purely speculative medium; the
speculator must stand to make substantial profits to justify the risk
of substantial loss. One cannot invest in futures as he might invest
in securities. 24 Theoretically, a trader could hold a long or short
futures position for approximately eighteen months, the longest life
of currently available futures contracts. As a practical matter, however, traders rarely hold a position for more than one or two
months. Traders without an interest in the underlying commodity
can reap substantial profit or, more probably, bear substantial
loss 2 5 in a few minutes. 26 If it can be said that profit is "unreasonable" only where it results from illegally distorted prices, then
it should follow that the speculator's profits are not unreasonable
but are rather a necessary inducement to his participation in the
market.2 7 A noted economist in this field, familiar with the
realities of futures trading, recognized the utility-even the neces22. Rainbolt, supra note 5, at 8.
23.
24.

[1973] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-14 (1973).
See S. ANGUST, SENsmLE SPECULATION IN CoMmiODrrIEs 14 (1972).

25. Feduniak, Commodity Futures: Still in Season, FINANCIAL WORLD,
October 15, 1977, at 49; Chicago's Booming Commodity Markets: Hotter than Wall
Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 13, 1977, at 81.
26. For a thorough discussion of profit and loss potential, see S. KROLL & I.
SusHKo, THE COMMODITY FuTUREs MARKET GUiDE 77-88 (1973).
27. President Roosevelt stated: "It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in
securities and commodities are necessary and of definite value to our commercial
and agricultural life. Nevertheless, it should be our national policy to restrict, as far
as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative operations." 78 CoNG.
REc. 2264 (1934) (addressing Congress concerning Securities Exchange Act of 1934),
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. III (1974).
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sity-of the speculator's participation in futures markets: "In every
futures transaction, the speculator incurs the duties and acquires
the rights of a holder of property and thus is an integral part of
commerce. Whether the impact of his activities is 'good' or 'bad'
28
is neither here nor there-they are inevitable and necessary."
To understand the role of the commodities speculator,2 9 it is
essential to understand his risk-bearing function. While the market
performs an insurance function for hedgers, 30 market participation
is dissimilar to insurance. Insurance eliminates risk by spreading it
among many similarly situated participants. On the other hand, futures markets merely transfer risk from hedgers, who wish to avoid
it, to speculators, who are willing to bear it and can presumably
afford it.
The speculator must bear not only the usual risks inherent in
investing, but the additional risks which arise out of certain practices peculiar to commodity futures trading, such as price limits.
Although a futures exchange is theoretically a perfect supply and
demand marketplace, 31 in practice it is not, even without intentional, illegal price distortion. Exchange price limits are an important source of market imperfection. Price limits mandate that the
price of a given futures contract cannot move more than a prescribed amount from the previous day's closing price. 32 Should the
price rise or fall that prescribed amount on the opening call, the
exchange will halt trading in that contract. Cessation in trading oc33
curs frequently and can last from a few minutes to several days.
An example may clarify the operation of limits. Assume trading in
January silver closes Monday at $4.50 per ounce. On Monday evening, some apocalyptically bearish news is released concerning the
price of silver. On Tuesday morning, the price of January silver is
likely to open at $4.30, down a representative 200 limit. There
might be a trade or two at that price, but more likely there will be
no trades and only an "ask" price of $4.30. If, during trading, there

28. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 140.
29. A speculator is "[o]ne who voluntarily accepts the risks associated with the
ownership of a commodity and relies on a price change in the commodity to produce
a profit, or risk premium, for his efforts." S. ANGRIST, supra note 24, at 205.
30. A hedge is "[a] commitment in the futures market which is established to
offset a cash commodity position." Id. at 201.
31.

T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 98.

32. Id. at 38; S. KROLL & I. SHISHKO, supra note 26, at 11.
33. In February 1973, soybean futures trading was halted for several days. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1973, at 47, col. 1.
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is no mitigation of the bad news, there will be no trading in
January silver that day. Outstanding longs will be unable to sell
because there are no willing buyers at $4.30. On Wednesday morning, if there is still no good news, January silver will open at an ask
price of $4.10. On Thursday, it will open at an ask price of $3.90,
and so on, until there is some good news or until the price falls
enough to balance demand with supply.
If trader A had bought one 5000 ounce contract of January
silver at Monday's closing price of $4.50, he would have put up the
established minimum margin of $2500, for which he would have
owned $22,500 in silver. At Tuesday's opening, A's silver would be
worth only $21,500. A would have lost $1000, forty percent of
risked capital. This loss would have occurred even if A had been
circumspect enough to enter a protective stop-loss order at $4.40,
because trading was not continuous between $4.50 and $4.30. In fact,
there may have been no trades at all between those levels.
If A had put up no more than the minimum margin requirement of $2500, he would get a $1000 margin call Tuesday morning.
At Wednesday's opening, a January silver contract would be worth
only $20,500. Then A's loss would be $2000, eighty percent of
margin. In this hypothetical situation, A could never have liquidated his position, even if he had entered a market order to sell
every morning, because no trading was taking place. A sell order
would not and could not be executed. Becoming "trapped" by successive "limit-down" days is quite common. Obviously, if A had
been short instead of long, he would have reaped windfall profits.
Since this hypothetical exchange's prescribed limit on silver is
200 either way, a day's trading range can be as much as 400-200
up, then 200 down from previous close, or vice versa. Assume that
last Friday's close had been $4.30. By Monday afternoon, January
silver was "limit-up" to $4.50. If trader A then bought before the
close at $4.50, and the apocalyptic news had hit the trading floor
after A's purchase but before close, then late Monday afternoon,
January silver would go "limit-down" to $4.10 per ounce. A would
have lost eighty percent of his capital in one afternoon or, more
likely, in an even shorter time. A never had a chance to liquidate.
Although this is an extreme example, similar situations occur frequently in futures markets.
THE TREATMENT OF FUTURES AS SECURITIES

Both speculator and hedger can trade only through an exchange or "contract market." A futures exchange is a nonprofit
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membership organization which does not buy or sell futures or set
futures prices.3 4 Exchanges draft and enforce many trading regulations, such as the quality standards for each commodity, the
specifications and verbiage of each contract, and the guarantee
mechanisms for buyers and sellers. Exchanges also set margin requirements which, with great variation, are currently about ten
percent of a given contract value. Futures exchanges perform functions analogous to those performed by securities exchanges. This
partially accounts for the inaccurate but not uncommon notion that
the two are intrinsically similar.
It is relatively easy to distinguish between futures markets and
securities markets. As a practical matter, futures trading is a zerosum game, that is, one man's profits are another man's losses. If
trader B buys a contract of December silver at $4.00, and sells at
$4.50, that 50¢ profit derives from the 50¢ loss on the part of the
holder of the short side of that same contract. Thus, in a bullish
futures market, there are as many losers as winners, while in a
bullish securities market, all participants can make money. This result is partially attributable to the complexity and great risks inherent in selling short in a securities market. But, in futures markets,
short-selling is commonplace and no more risky than any other
position.3 5
Despite the significant distinctions, the superficial similarity
between the two markets may have partially accounted for the application of securities law concepts to futures markets. Nonetheless, the conventional purchase and sale of commodity futures has
been held authoritatively not to constitute a securities transaction. 3 6 Unconventional vehicles related to futures trading, however, such as futures options, discretionary futures accounts,
warehouse receipts, and similar items3 7 have been held to fall
34. For a discussion of exchange functions, see T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2,
at 13-14.
35. Short-selling of stock is more risky than the average securities purchase
because in short-selling there is no limit to potential loss. In ordinary securities
purchases, loss is limited to purchase monies. In futures markets, short-selling is
natural and necessary to any purchase.
36. See Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Sinva,
Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). See also SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1974).
37. For a discussion of these unconventional vehicles, see Hodes & Dreyfus,
Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodities Futures-Are They Securities?, 30
Bus. LAW. 99 (1974); Selvers, supra note 18.
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within the purview of the Securities Act of 193338 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 39 After the effective date of the
CFTC Act, the Commission made clear its intent to exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction in these matters, particularly with respect to

options. 40 Misconceptions concerning the true role of the speculator and the nature and functions of futures, and confusion between securities and futures markets have contributed significantly
to certain of today's regulatory problems. There has been similar
confusion in defining manipulation as it operates in the futures

market, particularly with regard to the vital distinction between
speculation and manipulation.
MANIPULATION: MANAGING THE MARKET

Manipulation is another way true supply and demand are distorted. As Professor Hieronymus asserts, a workable definition of
manipulation has traditionally eluded authorities. 41 But it is indubitably true, as the court noted in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin,42 that
"the methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by
the ingenuity of man."43 Since the definition of manipulation has
been left to judicial and administrative construction, major cases
have produced several interesting differences of opinion concerning
what constitutes manipulation.
In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan,'4 4 the Seventh Circuit
adopted the definition, articulated in the prosecution's brief,
that manipulation is " 'the creation of an artificial price by planned
action, whether by one man or a group of men.' -45 The case concerned a "corner" 4 6 in rye and rye futures by General Foods and

others, but the requirement of intent in the Government's defini38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
40. See SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (preempting
SEC jurisdiction); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-19, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] CoMai. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,213 (Sept. 29, 1976) (preemption of state
regulation).
41. Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a
Definition, 6 HOFsTRA L. REV. 41, 43 (1977).
42. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
43. Id. at 1163.
44. 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948).
45. Id. at 231.
46. In a "comer," one trader holds a dominant position in both longs and shorts
for a particular futures month, as well as a dominant position in deliverable cash
supplies during the same period. J. BAER & 0. SAXoN, supra note 4, at 82-83.
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tion caused the conviction below to be reversed. 47 The court noted
that the CEA judicial officer had arbitrarily presumed consciously
collusive activity, rather than finding facts to that effect.4 8

In Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman,4 9 the Fifth Circuit held
that a "squeeze" does not violate the Commodity Exchange Act
unless it is intentional. The difference between a squeeze and
corner is esoteric, but the Volkart court relied upon an excellent
authority in concluding that "[a] squeeze is a relatively small corner, occurring in deliveries for some one month or some one grade.
Some-or, in fact, most-squeezes are inevitable on both the physical and the exchange markets and are not the result of illegal
manipulation." 50 In view of the facts, the court decided that the
defendant's actions did not constitute manipulation. 51
Under similar factual circumstances, the Eighth Circuit held
in Cargill that Cargill had intentionally maneuvered a squeeze in
the May 1963 wheat contract. 52 Although presented with little if
any direct proof of intent in this case, the court nevertheless found
the requisite intent in Cargill's market behavior. 53 The court also
criticized the Volkart opinion as having no regard for economic
realities. 54 The Cargill court may have been unaware of a circumstance which readily distinguishes Cargill from Volkart. In
47. 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948).
48. See id. at 230-31.
49. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
50. Id. at 59 (quoting J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 4, at 82-83). See also
Comment, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case,
21 U. Cmi. L. REV. 94 (1953); 73 YALE L.J. 171 (1963) (discussion of problems in defining manipulation).
51. Volkart Bros., Inc., v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962). The
court in Volkart reached this conclusion despite these traders' controlling long position on the exchanges, the insufficient supply of the commodity available to shorts
for delivery, and the establishment of artificially high prices by the traders in liquidation of futures contracts. See id.
52. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1172 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972). See 57 MINN. L. REv. 1243, 1243-44 (1973).
53. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1170-72 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
54. See id. at 1172-73. The court found that Cargill had had a dominant position
in cash supplies, whereas in Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1962), there was no question that the defendant corporation had negligible cash
commitments. This distinction requires a consideration of the terms "corner," and
"'squeeze." The question of which wheat supplies were available was also resolved
against Cargill, which had argued that Kansas City wheat was available and therefore
deliverable against Chicago futures contracts. This availability question is highly
complex, focusing ultimately on the difference between cash and futures prices. See
T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 152-66.
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Cargill defendant corporation had markedly greater control of
both the long futures positions outstanding on the expiration date
of the May contract and the available physical supplies of wheat in
nearby cash markets. 5 5 It is unclear whether the court realized
the importance of this distinction.
Despite the different facts in these two cases and the inconsistency of their rules, one element is common to all manipulation
cases of this general type: The alleged manipulator could not accomplish his purpose unless he eventually had some position in the
cash market. True speculators, with few if any exceptions, cannot
be manipulators. 56 The type of manipulation at issue here is that of
commodity price, not necessarily futures price. If we define the
general type of malfeasance discussed above as cornering and
squeezing manipulation, an examination of one recently alleged
corner, the so-called "Maine potato scandal ' 5 7 will support the notion that a true speculator, who never has any interest in the underlying commodity, virtually cannot corner or squeeze a market. If
speculation does not seriously distort commodity prices, there is
55. Also relevant to manipulation cases is the method used by courts to measure market manipulation. Courts measure the theoretical differential against the actual differential between cash and futures prices. In Cargill the court accepted the
four tests proposed by the Government to determine whether the futures price was
artificial, thus evidencing manipulation. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154,
1167-70 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Three of these tests compared, from an historical perspective, the particular wheat futures contract price with
the prices for the preceding nine years on the Chicago Board of Trade. However,
the fourth test analyzed whether this futures price bore a proper relationship to the
price of cash wheat at that time. This test's application postulated that the price of
the future should be 22¢ to 3V less than "spot," the price of cash wheat which reflects

warehousing costs. On this basis, the court concluded that the futures price was
artifically high. This is a dangerous presumption, since there are numerous possible
causes of distortion between cash and normal futures prices that do not reflect manipulation. See note 15 supra and accompanying text, T. HiEONyMUS, supra note 2,
at 171-72
56. T. HmERONYMUS, supra note 2, at 338, notes that market dominance by a
large speculator should be avoided, and that there are certain extraordinary situations
where the sheer size of a speculative position may have deleterious consequences.
See Breaking the Hunts' Grip on Soybeans, Bus. WEEK, May 16, 1977, at 40-41, detailing a recent CFTC allegation which remains unresolved as of this writing. The
CFTC here alleged manipulation by a family of traders which held more than seven
times the speculative position limit in soybean futures. The allegation, which apparently did not reflect the industry view on the question, was made prior to any
known cash dealings by the Hunts in soybeans. Id.
57. This scandal involved a massive default in delivery against the May 1976
potato futures contract on the New York Mercantile Exchange. In this, perhaps the
largest manipulation ever attempted through a contract market, virtually no speculators were involved. See How Jack Simplot, Other Big Traders, Waged a Potato War,
Wall St. J., June 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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support for Professor Hieronymus's suggestion that speculative
position limits should be eliminated. 5 8 Large-scale speculators
benefit futures markets and limits are detrimental to their interests.
There are many types of manipulation. 59 Some involve questionable practices on the exchange floor, such as the "dual trading"
capability of futures floor brokers.6 0 The CFITC has addressed this
issue, 6 1 however, and is moving toward the firm control of this
"floor" manipulation. Insider trading is a more general type of
manipulation which has not been subject to extensive CFTC concern. This lack of concern arises from a superficial, confusing comparison of futures insider trading with its securities counterpart.
The substantive rules concerning insider trading that have developed in federal securities law are only conceptually relevant to
futures insider trading questions. The CFTC has dealt only with
the most narrow concept of insider trading, by prohibiting under
threat of criminal prosecution the use of information by insiders
who are commissioners, employees, or agents of the CFTC. Underlying both the securities and the corporate regulatory posture is
the common law principle of fiduciary duty. 62 It would seem clear
that the grain company president who confidentially learns of an
impending "Russian wheat deal" 63 and trades for his own account
based on such inside information operates to the detriment of the
market. Such trading falsifies prices and defrauds those who take
the opposite side of his transactions. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
reach his conduct by any stretch of the common law fiduciary duty
theory. Although it is possible that a broad antifraud regulation
might discourage insider trading, the development of specific regulations to deal directly with the abuse would be more effective. A
wholly new solution is required to regulate effectively insider trad-

58.

See Hieronymus, supra note 41, at 54-56.

59. See id. at 45-50.
60.

"Dual trading" refers to a floor broker's capacity to trade for his own as

well as other accounts; such trading enlarges the possibility of a particularly devious
kind of manipulation. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Small Business Problems of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
160-63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Small Business Hearing]; T. HnRoNYMUS, supra
note 2, at 342-44.

61. See 40 Fed. Reg. 58,660 (1975), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,118 (1975) (proposed regulation regarding dual
trading).
62. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1 9 4 9 );
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).

63. See generally Small Business Hearing,supra note 60, at 377.
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ing in futures markets. Securities treatment of the problem is relevant only to perception of the issue, not to its control. Certain
distinctions which are irrelevant to securities insider trading, such
as that between speculating and hedging, might well be useful in
determining who has futures information that is truly "inside."
Logically, those who deal daily in the underlying commodity would
be more likely to learn useful information than those who deal exclusively in futures.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
This article has attempted to explain futures markets, to define
the role of the speculator, to describe manipulation in commodities
markets, and to indicate certain regulatory problems which remain
to be solved.
The average speculator in today's futures market may once
have been the average investor protected by securities legislation.
In recent years, many securities investors became disillusioned with
the stock market, and viewed commodity futures as a new vehicle
for using limited risk capital. Thousands of these average traders
sought entry into futures by means of "naked" options in the early
1970's; they were lavishly defrauded." With the advent of the
CFTC, such traders may rightly expect adequate protection. Examining certain common misconceptions about futures would further
an accurate understanding of certain fundamentals and aid in determining the proper regulation of major abuses.
The foregoing analysis suggests certain conclusions. First, the
CFTC should recognize that it has two separate regulatory constituencies: speculators who deal only in futures, who are vital to
the markets, and hedgers, who deal regularly in the commodity
itself and for whom the markets are vital. The ideal regulatory
posture would take into account this distinction, 6 5 particularly as it
relates to the definition and treatment of manipulation and to the
imposition of exchange limits.
Second, both large and small speculation should be encouraged
in an orderly fashion. This could be accomplished by large-scale
64. See Rainbolt, supra note 5, at 14.
65. T. HImloNym-us, supra note 2, at 328-29, suggests that speculation and
hedging are very similar processes based on risk exposure. While this notion may
be correct, the terms are used here to attempt to classify persons, not transactions. This
classification is more useful in analyzing, for example, the requisite intent for a
finding of manipulation.
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dissemination of information and establishment of an options program, 66 as well as by regulations designed generally to protect the
average trader from abuse. Encouragement is necessary, since the
recent scandals and the enormous risks to which speculators are
exposed are natural disincentives to market entry.
Third, regulation should reflect the essential differences in the
underlying nature of commodities markets. No future is an agricultural item, but futures contracts that deal with agricultural products should be recognized as involving a unique set of problems.
The CFTC could regulate agriculturally based markets with a
view toward the needs of those markets, their hedgers, and their
speculators. Since many agricultural markets operate only in the
United States, there should be a difference between regulating
domestic corn markets and regulating the worldwide markets in
gold and silver. While there have been corners or squeezes in gold
and silver, it is difficult to conceive of a successful corner in certain
of the financial markets, in foreign currencies, or in Treasury bills.
Finally, securities markets and securities laws should be relegated to their proper position in relation to futures markets and
futures regulations. Securities laws are analogous, but should not
be dispositive. The distinction between the two requires further
elucidation. Recently, the CIFTC has come under severe attack 67
on a number of grounds; suggested remedies have included a return
of authority over futures regulation to the USDA.68 It has been
demonstrated that this return of authority would be wholly inadequate. Whatever the problems of the fledgling, understaffed Commission, a more realistic regulatory approach furthering the expeditious opening of the markets to all potential traders would benefit
the speculator, the industry, and the Commission. The average
trader wishes to, and undoubtedly will eventually, enter these markets. The CFTC must energetically police, and perhaps redevelop
"the badlands of the commodity market."6 9
66.

See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 51,808 (1976), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer

Binder] Comm.FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,236 (1976) (regulations of commodity option transactions).

67. See The Futures Regulator Comes Under Fire, Bus. WVEEK, August 15,
1977, at 97.

68. See id.
69. Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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